Introduction
In this chapter we shall be concerned with Russell's criticism of Kant's explanation of the synthetic a priori . Much of what Russell has to say here is based on the well-known interpretation of transcendental idealism as a species of psychologism . Attending to the details of what Russell has to say about Kant, however, helps us to see that there is more to it than just a rather simplistic misreading of Kant. Ultimately, what is at stake here is the contrast between two radically different perspectives on the synthetic a priori : epistemic (Kant) and metaphysical (Russell).
Russell's reading of Kant has a great deal in common with an interpretation of transcendental idealism which used to be common in Anglo-American literature on Kant. Indeed, Henry E. Allison (1983) has dubbed this interpretation the standard picture. As Allison explains, it represents transcendental idealism as a combination of phenomenalism (not unlike that of Berkeley) with the dubious, if not downright incoherent, postulation of 'things in themselves ' (ibid., 3-6) .
The Kant that emerges from the standard picture is a sense-data theorist of a rather peculiar kind. As one would expect from a sense-data theorist, Kant, too, is said to have as his starting point a contrast between things that appear to us by affecting us and the way they appear to us, which is dependent upon our constitution (cf. Strawson 1966, 38-42) . There are thus two elements in our experience, one that is due to objects and one that is our own contribution. What is unique to Kant is the way he conceives of these two elements; he assigns the entire spatio-temporal framework, as well as the relations between sense data, to the subject and leaves to objects only the crude material that is given in sensation (Russell 1912a, 48 This is of course serious enough. Even if it can be rescued from the charge of unintelligibility, however, Kant's doctrine is still vulnerable to an attack that looks equally devastating. By limiting knowledge to the subjective realm of representations -that is what appearances amount to in the standard picture -transcendental idealism in fact undermines the very possibility of our ever having genuine knowledge. That we only know appearances means now that we do not know things as they are but only as they appear to us; and yet 'things as they are', being the source of our representations, also figure semantically in an explanation of what our representations are supposed to be about . As Russell puts it, 'Kant thought that things in themselves are causes (or grounds) of presentations, but cannot be known by means of presentations ' (1900, 133) . Understood in this way, Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves in fact turns out to be a case of perceptual illusion .
1 A thing in itself is like a straight stick which has been partially submerged in water and looks bent to an observer. In this way, Russell observes, our own contributions to cognition 'interpose a mirage of illusion which cannot be penetrated at any point ' (1927a, 199) . As Prichard (1909, 72) points out, since knowing a thing means simply to know that thing as it really is, we must conclude that, according to Kant, we do not know anything at all.
The relativized model of the a priori
Russell's acceptance of the standard picture is clearest after his adoption of the sense-data analysis of perception. But a very similar picture is plausibly read into the rather brief remarks on Kant that we find in such earlier works as the Leibniz book or PoM . Russell's criticisms, too, echo the standard picture. The bottom line is that the transcendental idealist picture of human cognition undermines, one way or another, our claims to possessing genuine knowledge.
As Russell sees it, the root problem is the subjectivism inherent in transcendental idealism. The threat is particularly evident in the case of synthetic a priori knowledge (since analyticity is not at issue here, I shall henceforth drop the qualification 'synthetic'). Even if it could be
